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POLICY FRAMEWORK TO STRENGTHEN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS 
 
 
Challenge 
States have added 1 million prison cells over the past 20 years, pushing the U.S. prison population to 2.3 
million and the incarceration rate past 1 in 100 adults, by far the highest in the world.  Still, more than 
95 percent of inmates are eventually released back to the community.  Add in offenders on probation, 
parole or other post-prison supervision and there are now 7.3 million American adults under 
correctional control on any given day.  The corrections system costs states nearly $50 billion a year, and 
federal and local governments billions more. 
 
That kind of money might be justified if it were dramatically cutting crime.  But it’s not.  More than 40 
percent of probationers do not complete their probation period successfully and more than half of 
parolees end up back behind bars within three years.  While repeat offenders are major drivers of prison 
growth and costs, so are people who have broken the rules of their probation or parole release but who 
have not committed a new crime.  Offenders who violate their supervision conditions account for a 
significant portion of prison admissions, reducing space available for violent and chronic criminals.   
 
These high failure rates stem in large part from overwhelmed community supervision agencies.  While 
national attention has focused on the dramatic rise of incarceration, the probation and parole 
populations have risen just as fast.  The agencies responsible for supervising these 5 million offenders, 
however, haven’t received nearly enough resources or authority to keep up. 
 
Solution 
More than 25 years of research has identified a series of policies and practices that can make substantial 
cuts in recidivism rates.  Policy makers in several states have enacted reforms that help corrections 
agencies adopt these “evidence-based practices” by providing fiscal incentives, clearing obstacles, 
enhancing their authority, and tracking their results. 
 
During 2008, the Public Safety Performance Project of The Pew Charitable Trusts’ Center on the States 
brought together leading policy makers, practitioners and researchers to review a wide range of these 
reforms.  From the review and discussions with dozens of additional experts emerged a package of 
policy-level actions for state legislators and executives.  The measures below were selected as part of 
the initial framework; others may be added as state and local leaders continue to innovate.  And though 
individual sections would have impact if adopted alone, taken together they offer policy makers a 
powerful opportunity to help reduce victimization and control corrections costs. 
 
A Word About Implementation 
State criminal laws and justice systems vary widely, as do the capacities of community corrections 
agencies to implement the proposed policy changes.  To account for this, many of the provisions contain 
bracketed terms or timeframes that may need to be adjusted to fit the circumstances in individual 
states.  The recommendations in brackets should be viewed as starting points for deliberations.  In 
addition, some of the provisions could be adopted by executive order or court rule as well as by 
legislative action. 
 
 Executive Summary (12/15/08)                   Page 2 of 3 
Policy Framework to Strengthen Community Corrections    
Pew Center on the States, Public Safety Performance Project 
 
Menu of Policy Options 
Full provisions—including suggested language for legislation, executive order or court rules, research 
rationale and state examples—are available by clicking on the links provided below. 
 
1. Evidence-Based Practices  
• Requires 75 percent of offenders be supervised in accordance with evidence-based practices 
within four years. 
• Requires that 75 percent of state funds spent on programs and treatment be spent on programs 
that are evidence-based within four years. 
• Requires use of objective risk assessment tools to assign supervision levels and development of 
individual case plans. 
• Requires agencies to provide employees training on evidence-based practices. 
• Sets aside a portion of agency funds for research on program effectiveness. 
 
2.  Earned Compliance Credits 
• Creates an “earned compliance credit” that would reduce the time that offenders are on active 
supervision by 15 days for each month that they are in full compliance with their conditions of 
supervision, including payment of restitution to crime victims.  After an offender has paid all 
outstanding restitution, fines and fees, the court or releasing authority may reduce the period of 
supervision by the amount of credit earned.   
 
3. Administrative Sanctions 
 Requires community corrections agencies to adopt a set of swift, certain and graduated 
sanctions and rewards to respond to violations and compliance with the conditions of 
supervision. 
 Establishes authority for agencies to impose graduated sanctions and rewards through an 
administrative process.  
 
4. Performance Incentive Funding 
 Establishes performance-based funding for local jurisdictions or state regions/districts so that 
community corrections agencies will receive a portion of the imprisonment costs averted when 
they reduce the rate of new felony convictions and the rate of revocations for technical 
violations.    
 Additional savings will be appropriated to agencies if they show improvement in each of three 
other key outcome measures: employment, drug test failures, and victim restitution collection. 
 Eliminates incentive funding if there is an increase in the agency’s new felony conviction rate for 
probationers and parolees. 
 Permits incentive funding to be used to implement evidence-based practices, expand effective 
offender programming, and provide grants to victim service organizations. 
 
5. Performance Measurement 
• Requires community corrections agencies to set up a system to track and report regularly on key 
performance measures as defined by the American Correctional Association and the American 
Probation and Parole Association. 
• The measures are:  recidivism, employment, substance use, payment of victim restitution, 
compliance with “no contact” orders, and the overall performance of offenders as measured by 
the type of discharge from supervision. 
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Policy Framework Reviewers 
The following experts reviewed drafts of the provisions in the framework.  Neither they nor their current 
or former organizations necessarily endorse the findings or recommended provisions. 
 
 Steve Aos, Wash. State Institute for Public Policy 
 James Austin, The JFA Institute 
 Jeffrey Beard, PA Dept. of Corrections 
 Peggy Burke, Center for Effective Public Policy 
 Bill Burrell, Temple University 
 Pam Casey, National Center for State Courts 
 Elyse Clawson, Crime and Justice Institute 
 Marshall Clement, Council of State Governments 
Justice Center 
 Ernest Eley, MD Division of Parole and Probation 
 Judith Greene, Justice Strategies 
 Gary Hinzman, IA Dept. of Correctional Services 
 Lisa Holley, State of Rhode Island Parole Board 
 George Keiser, National Institute of Corrections 
 Alison Lawrence, National Conference of State 
Legislatures 
 Mary Lou Leary, National Center for Victims of Crime 
 Dan Levey, Advisor for Victims, AZ Governor’s Office 
 Marc Levin, Texas Public Policy Foundation 
 Donna Lyons, National Conference of State 
Legislatures 
 Thomas MacLellan, National Governors Association 
 Ginger Martin, OR Dept. of Corrections 
 Andrew Molloy, Bureau of Justice Assistance 
 
 Don Murray, National Association of Counties 
 Pat Nolan, Prison Fellowship 
 Ron Reinstein, AZ Center for Evidence Based 
Sentencing 
 Ed Rhine, OH Dept. of Rehabilitation and Correction 
 Judith Sachwald, Community Corrections consultant 
 Dennis Schrantz, MI Dept. of Corrections 
 Anne Seymour, Crime Victims consultant 
 Alison Shames, Vera Institute of Justice 
 Carol Shapiro, Family Justice 
 Gary Sherzan, IA Dept. of Corrections, retired 
 Amy Solomon, Urban Institute 
 Richard Stroker, Center for Effective Public Policy 
 Faye Taxman, George Mason University 
 Michael Thompson, Council of State Governments 
Justice Center 
 Tony Thompson, New York University School of Law 
 Charles Traughber, TN Board of Probation and Parole 
 Roger Warren, National Center for State Courts 
 Kim Weibrecht, Crime and Justice Institute 
 Roger Werholtz, KS Dept. of Corrections 
 Carl Wicklund, American Probation and Parole 
Association 
 Dan Wilhelm, Vera Institute of Justice 
 
Pew Public Safety Performance Project Staff 
Adam Gelb, Director 
Richard Jerome, Manager 
Jake Horowitz, Senior Associate 
Joe Gavrilovich, Administrative Assistant 
 
For further information, please contact: 
The Pew Charitable Trusts, Public Safety Performance Project 
1025 F Street NW, 9th Floor 
Washington, DC 20004 
phone: 202.552.2083 
e-mail: jgavrilovich@pewtrusts.org  
 
 
 
More information available at www.pewpublicsafety.org.  
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1 
 
 
Evidence-Based Practices 
 
Problem 
On any given day in this country, over 7 million offenders are under some form of correctional 
supervision.  About 2.3 million adults are in state and federal prisons and jails; more than 5 
million are on probation, parole or some form of government supervision after release from 
prison.  About 4 in 10 probationers don’t successfully complete their period of supervision, and 
half of those released from prison wind up back behind bars within three years.  This revolving 
door of offenders contributes to crime in our communities and the exploding cost of 
corrections. 
 
Solution 
Back in the 1970s, it was thought that “nothing works” to set offenders on the straight and 
narrow.  But research and practice over the past 25 years have identified new strategies and 
policies that can make a significant dent in recidivism rates.  Implementing these research-
backed programs and procedures is called "evidence-based practice." 
 
Probation and parole agencies across the country are working to adopt these practices, which 
include using risk assessment tools to determine appropriate levels and types of supervision 
and ensuring that programs focus on behaviors and attitudes that drive criminal activity.  With 
the active support of policy makers, probation and parole agencies will be able to accelerate 
their adoption of these and other evidence-based practices, helping offenders stay crime- and 
drug-free and avoiding the social and financial costs of building more prisons. 
 
This provision: 
 Requires that 75 percent of offenders be supervised in accordance with evidence-based 
practices within four years. 
 Requires that 75 percent of state funds for offender programming be spent on programs 
that are evidence-based within four years. 
 Requires community corrections agencies to improve policies and practices for crime 
victims. 
 Requires agencies to provide employees training on evidence-based practices. 
 Sets aside a portion of agency funds for research on program effectiveness. 
 
 
Suggested Language 
 
Section 101.  Short Title. 
 
This Act may be cited as the “Recidivism Reduction Act.” 
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Section 102.  Definitions. 
 
In this title, the following words have the meanings indicated.  
 
(1)  “Agency” means: 
(A) The Department of Corrections or the state agency responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by the courts or serving a period of parole or post-
release supervision from prison or jail; and 
(B) Any regional, local or county governmental agencies responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by the courts or serving a period of parole or post-
release supervision from prison or jail, provided such agencies receive state funding. 
 
(2)  “Evidence-based practices” means supervision policies, procedures, programs and practices 
that scientific research demonstrates reduce recidivism among individuals on probation, parole, 
or post-release supervision. 
 
(3)  “Community supervision” means: 
(A) The placement of a defendant under supervision, with conditions imposed by a court 
for a specified period during which: 
(i) criminal proceedings are deferred without an adjudication of guilt;  
(ii) a sentence of imprisonment or confinement, imprisonment and fine, or 
confinement and fine, is probated and the imposition of sentence is suspended in 
whole or in part; or 
(B) The placement of an individual under supervision after release from prison or jail, 
with conditions imposed by the releasing authority for a specified period. 
 
(4)  “Supervised individual” means an individual placed on probation by a court or serving a 
period of parole or post-release supervision from prison or jail. 
 
(5)  "Supervision officer" means a person appointed or employed by the Agency to supervise 
individuals placed on community supervision. 
 
(6) “Criminal risk factors” means characteristics and behaviors that when addressed or changed 
affect a person’s risk for committing crimes.  Scientific research identifies these characteristics 
and behaviors as including:  antisocial attitudes, values, and beliefs; poor impulse control; 
criminal personality; substance abuse; criminal peers; dysfunctional family; and lack of 
employment or education. 
 
(7)  “Case plan” means an individualized accountability and behavior change strategy for 
supervised individuals that: 
(A)  Targets and prioritizes the specific criminal risk factors of the offender; 
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(B)  Matches programs to the offender’s individual characteristics, such as gender, 
culture, motivational stage, developmental stage, and learning style; 
(C)  Establishes a timetable for achieving specific behavioral goals, including a schedule 
for payment of victim restitution, child support, and other financial obligations; 
(D)  Specifies positive and negative actions that will be taken in response to the 
supervised individual’s behaviors. 
 
(8) (A) “Program” means an intervention that: 
(i)  is intended to reduce recidivism by supervised individuals; and 
(ii)  is funded in whole or in part by the state or administered by any agency of state 
government; 
 (B) “Program” does not include medical services. 
 
Section 103.  Implementation of Evidence-Based Practices to Reduce Recidivism. 
 
(1)  The Agency shall adopt policies, rules and regulations that within [four] years of the 
effective date of this Act result in at least [75 percent] of supervised individuals being 
supervised in accordance with evidence-based practices. 
 
(2)  The policies, rules and regulations shall include: 
(A)  Adoption, validation and utilization of an objective risk and needs assessment tool; 
(B)  Use of assessment scores and other objective criteria to determine the risk level and 
program needs of each supervised individual, prioritizing supervision and program 
resources for offenders who are at higher risk to re-offend; 
(C)  Definitions of low, moderate and high risk levels during the period of supervision; 
(D)  Development of a case plan, based on the assessment, for each individual who is 
assessed to be moderate to high risk; 
(E)  Swift, certain, proportionate and graduated responses that an Agency employee will 
apply in response to a supervised individual’s compliant and non-compliant behaviors; 
(F)  Caseload size guidelines that are based on offender risk levels and take into account 
Agency resources and employee workload; and 
(G)  Establishment of protocols and standards that assess the degree to which Agency 
policies, procedures, programs and practices relating to offender recidivism reduction 
are evidence based. 
 
(3)  Within [four] years of the effective date of this Act, [75 percent] of state monies expended 
on programs shall be for programs that are in accordance with evidence-based practices. 
 
(4)  Within [four] years of the effective date of this Act, the Agency shall eliminate supervision 
policies, procedures, programs and practices intended to reduce recidivism that scientific 
research demonstrates do not reduce recidivism. 
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Section 104.  Improvement of Policies and Practices for Crime Victims. 
 
(1)  The Agency shall adopt policies, rules and regulations that improve crime victim satisfaction 
with the criminal justice system, including: 
(A)  Payment by supervised individuals of victim restitution and child support; 
(B)  The opportunity for victims to complete victim impact statements or provide input 
into pre-sentence investigation reports; 
(C)  Providing victims information about their rights and services, and referrals to access 
those rights and services;  
(D)  Offering victims the opportunity to complete a “victim satisfaction survey,” with 
data used to measure Agency performance; and 
(E)  Facilitate victim-offender dialogue when the victim is willing. 
 
Section 105.  Professional Development. 
 
(1)  The Agency shall provide its employees with intensive initial and on-going training and 
professional development services to support the implementation of evidence-based practices. 
 
(2)  The training and professional development services shall include assessment techniques, 
case planning, risk reduction and intervention strategies, effective communication skills, 
substance abuse and other topics identified by the Agency or its employees. 
 
Section 106.  Data Collection, Analysis and Research. 
 
(1) The state [Department of Corrections] shall allocate a minimum of [X] percent of its 
operating budget to support data collection, analysis and research on supervision and 
programmatic effectiveness. 
 
(2) The state [Department of Corrections] may form partnerships or enter into contracts with 
institutions of higher education or other qualified organizations for assistance with data 
collection, analysis and research. 
 
Section 107.  Agency Report. 
 
(1)  By [March 1] of each year, beginning in 2010, the Agency shall submit to the Governor, the 
Legislature and the judicial branch a comprehensive report on its efforts to implement this Act.  
The report shall include: 
 
(A)  The percentage of supervised individuals being supervised in accordance with 
evidence-based practices; 
(B)  The percentage of state monies expended for programs that are evidence based, 
and a list of all programs with identification of which are evidence based;  
  
Evidence-Based Practices (12/15/08)             Page 5 of 11 
Policy Framework to Strengthen Community Corrections 
Pew Center on the States, Public Safety Performance Project 
 
(C)  Specification of supervision policies, procedures, programs and practices that were 
eliminated; 
(D)  The results of victim satisfaction surveys administered under Section 104 of this 
title; 
(E)   The Agency’s recommendations for resource allocation, and any additional 
collaboration with other state, regional or local public agencies, private entities, or faith-
based and community organizations. 
 
(2)  The Agency shall make the full report and an executive summary available to the general 
public on its website. 
 
Notes and Drafting Alternatives 
 
Items in [brackets] are terms, figures and timeframes that states may wish to adjust to their 
individual preferences or circumstances, such as the capacity of their community corrections 
agencies to implement the policy recommendations. 
 
 Section 102 (agency definition):  This definition is a placeholder intended to reflect the 
broad range of community supervision governing structures in the states.  States may want 
to reflect the name(s) of the relevant corrections agency or agencies.  Local government 
agencies (such as probation or other community corrections agencies) are included in this 
definition, so long as the local agencies receive state funds. 
 
 Section 102 (program definition):  Probation and parole agencies use a wide variety of 
programs that are intended to reduce recidivism.  Those programs are funded by numerous 
sources, including the agency itself, other state government agencies (such as the health 
department), private organizations, and offender self-pay.  Because this provision measures 
the percentage of state monies expended on programs that are evidence based, the 
definition of program is limited to programs administered by the agency or those that 
receive state money.  However, states should make efforts to ensure that all recidivism 
reduction programs used by community corrections agencies are subject to the standards of 
evidence-based practice, whether or not the agencies administer or pay for the programs 
themselves.  For clarity, the definition does not extend to programs aimed at collecting 
victim restitution, administering community service, or overall victim satisfaction with the 
justice system.  Those goals are addressed in other sections of this policy framework. 
 
 Section 103(1) (75 percent requirement):  Community corrections agencies vary in their 
capacity to implement evidence-based practices.  States may want to vary the timetable for 
implementation to be longer or shorter than the recommended four years.  States also may 
want to establish a progressive schedule for implementation, as Oregon did by requiring 
that in the first two years, 25 percent of state monies be spent on programs that are 
evidence based, 50 percent in the second two years and reaching the 75 percent goal by the 
third biennium.  The recommended requirement is for 75 percent rather than the full 100 
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percent to permit agencies to innovate with programs and practices that have a sound basis 
in theory but have not yet been validated by rigorous research.  Also, for agency supervision 
policies and practices, the provision uses the percentage of “supervised individuals who are 
supervised in accordance to evidence based practices,” rather than assessing the 
percentage of supervision procedures that are evidence based.  Procedures and practices 
will still need to be evaluated, but the language seeks to ensure that most of the individuals 
supervised are being covered by evidence based practices.  An agency where 75 percent of 
practices are evidence based, but the majority of offenders are being supervised using the 
remaining 25 percent of procedures and practices would undermine the purposes of the 
provision. 
 
 Section 103 (elimination of ineffective programs):  While research identifies policies, 
procedures, programs and practices that work to reduce recidivism, it also has identified 
those that do not.1  This provision is intended to ensure that these ineffective approaches 
are eliminated quickly, while recognizing that it may take agencies some time to establish 
new policies, procedures, programs and practices that will meet the evidence-based 
standard.  This provision is not intended to apply to policies, procedures, programs or 
practices that are aimed at goals other than recidivism, such as victim reparation, 
community service, or the payment of fines and fees. 
 
 Section 103 (graduated responses):  See the “Administrative Sanctions” section of this 
policy framework for additional guidance on probation/parole revocations and procedures 
for making responses to compliant and non-compliant behavior more swift, certain, 
proportionate and graduated. 
 
 Sections 103 and 106 (verification and reporting):  States that want to provide additional 
motivation for agencies to implement evidence-based practices can enhance these sections 
in two ways.  First, states might specify that assessment of fidelity to evidence-based 
practices be conducted by outside experts, or that the tool used by the Agency to assess 
fidelity be developed by an external entity.  One commonly used commercially available 
tool is the Correctional Program Assessment Inventory (CPAI-2000).  Second, states may 
want to consider designating an external agency (such as the State Auditor) to monitor 
compliance with this Act. 
 
Rationale 
 
Agency Policies, Procedures, Programs and Practices Should Be Evidence Based.  The 
implementation of evidence-based practices results in an average decrease in future crime of 
between 10 percent and 20 percent, whereas programs that are not evidence-based tend to 
see no decrease and even a slight increase in future crime.2 Interventions that follow all 
evidence-based practices can achieve recidivism reductions of 30 percent.3  Many state statutes 
and administrative regulations specify that certain correctional services and programs must be 
evidence-based.  Oregon has taken a comprehensive approach by passing legislation in 2003 
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requiring that by the 2009-2011 biennium, at least 75 percent of all state monies for 
programming be spent on programs that are evidence-based.4 
 
Risk and Need Assessment.  Supervision and programs are most effective at reducing future 
crime when they (i) accurately assess offender risk and need, and (ii) use assessment results to 
assign supervision levels (more intensive monitoring for offenders with greater risk) and target 
programs to criminogenic needs.5  Assignment of offenders to the correct supervision levels is 
crucial, since research shows that putting low-risk offenders in intensive programming actually 
increases their recidivism rates.6  Using risk and needs assessments to determine how to 
supervise offenders allows community corrections agencies to better allocate their resources 
and focus their supervision on high-risk offenders.  
 
Individualized Case Plans.  The value of a risk and needs assessment is that it provides a 
framework from which quality case planning can occur.  Intervention programs are most 
effective when targeted at higher risk offenders and when targeting their crime-related needs.  
The individualized case plan is the ideal mechanism with which to ensure that offenders and 
their supervising officers focus their time, energy, and resources on those activities – such as 
attending treatment – that are most needed to reduce the likelihood of future criminal 
behavior.  When adopted in conjunction with other effective supervision practices, use of 
individualized case plans has been shown to reduce new arrests and technical violations of 
offenders on community supervision7  Maryland and some other jurisdictions incorporate the 
case plan into a signed agreement between supervised individuals and their supervision officers 
called a “behavioral contract.”  The contract approach can boost the effectiveness of the case 
plan by requiring that the offender discuss and buy in to the expectations set forth in the 
contract/plan. 8   
 
Graduated Responses.  Research has shown that using “graduated sanctions”—employing 
structured, swift, and incremental responses to violations—can increase offender compliance.  
The practice has been used in many jurisdictions to reduce crime and drug use by probationers 
and drug court participants.9  In one study, drug court offenders in a Graduated Sanctions 
Program, which emphasized administering sanctions for positive drug urine tests swiftly, with 
certainty, and with increasing severity, had substantially lower rearrest rates (19 percent 
compared to 27 percent in the control group) two years after sentencing than offenders who 
were not in the program.10  In addition, positive responses to offender compliance have been 
shown to reinforce and motivate offenders to stay on the straight and narrow.  [See the 
Administrative Sanctions section of this policy framework for recommendations on graduated 
sanctions.] 
 
Caseloads and Workloads.  The size of caseloads for parole and probation officers should 
reflect the level of risk and needs of the offenders being supervised.  They also should reflect an 
analysis of the workload and resources of the agency.  By varying caseloads based on the risk of 
the offenders being supervised, parole and probation officers can focus their resources on 
higher risk offenders, and use less intense supervision methods for low risk offenders.  
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Although a number of studies have attempted to identify the “ideal” caseload size for 
maximum effectiveness, the quality and nature of the contacts between a supervision officer 
and an offender have been shown to be more important than the quantity of contacts.11  Many 
states also are adopting geographically-based caseloads (“place-based supervision”).  By 
supervising offenders where they live, fostering relationships with those who know them best, 
and becoming familiar with local resources and high-risk areas, parole and probation officers 
are much better positioned to manage their caseloads. 
  
Data Collection, Analysis and Research.  A fundamental principle of effective correctional 
management is the measurement of outcomes.12  The provision allocating a proportion of the 
correctional agency’s operation budget to research is intended to promote the implementation 
and long-term sustainability of data collection, analysis, and research as the collection and 
analysis of criminal justice data is a critical component to evidence-based practice in 
community supervision.13  These funds can be used to track program outcomes and fidelity to 
evidence based requirements.  [See the Performance Measurement section of this policy 
framework for recommendations on performance measures of community supervision 
programs.] 
 
Professional Development.  Generally, successful implementation of EBP in community 
corrections must include adoption of fundamental organizational development principles, such 
as establishing clear goals and expectations for staff, measuring progress and providing 
feedback on performance.14  Research also shows that those correctional interventions that are 
most effective are those that ensure that staff are appropriately skilled and trained in specific 
offender management techniques.15  Several states and counties, including Maryland, Iowa, 
Oregon, Illinois, Maine, Maricopa County (AZ), and Travis County (TX), have made a substantial 
commitment to enhancing professional development by training staff on effective supervision 
techniques, accurate completion of risk assessments, development and use of productive case 
plans, and use of motivational interviewing in case management.   
 
State Examples 
 
Evidence Based Supervision Practices and Programs 
 Maine:  HB 1327 (requiring that local jurisdictions establish criminal justice planning 
committees to update and increase the use of evidence-based correctional practices);  
 North Carolina:  General Statutes 143B, article 6a, section 17.15(d) (part of the North 
Carolina State-County Criminal Justice Partnership Act)(the “Research and Planning 
Division of the Department of Correction shall review national best practice programs 
for community corrections and recommend whether the types of programs currently 
being funded should continue to be funded, and whether alternative programs should 
be funded if a county wants to expand sanction options.”)  See also, Juvenile Justice 
Reform Act of 1998 (§ 147-33.55) (requires that the state juvenile justice office fund 
programs “that it determines to be effective in preventing delinquency and recidivism.  
Programs that have proven to be ineffective shall not be funded.”) 
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(http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=1997&BillID=
S1260) 
 Oklahoma:  HB 2101 (establishing task force to identify evidence-based programs in 
reentry support);  
 Oregon:  SB 267, Sections 3-9 of Oregon Laws 2003. This law requires the Oregon 
Department of Corrections, the Youth Commission and the Criminal Justice Commission 
to ensure that a specified portion of their programs or interventions are experimentally 
tested, cost-effective approaches to reducing a person’s propensity to commit crimes.  
For the biennium beginning 2005, 25 percent of programs and interventions are 
expected to meet these criteria.  For the 2007 biennium, this increases to 50 percent 
and in 2009 and future biennium this increases to 75 percent.  The agencies addressed 
by this legislation must audit and report on their spending on programs and are warned 
that “the Legislative Assembly shall consider the agency’s failure to meet the 
requirement… of this section in making appropriations to the agency for the following 
biennium.” (http://www.leg.state.or.us/03orlaws/sess0600.dir/0669ses.htm) 
 Tennessee:  Public Chapter 585, SB 1790. “The Department of Children's Services, and 
any other state agency that administers funds related to the prevention, treatment or 
care of delinquent juveniles, shall not expend state funds on any juvenile justice 
program or program related to the prevention, treatment or care of delinquent 
juveniles, including any service model or delivery system in any form or by any name, 
unless the program is evidence-based.”  The legislation goes on to protect innovation by 
stating, “The department shall continue the ongoing research and evaluation of sound, 
theory-based and research-based programs with the goal of identifying and expanding 
the number and type of available evidence-based programs, and to that end the 
department may engage in and fund pilot programs as defined in this section.”  Like the 
Oregon law, this legislation includes a “phase in” period, with the percentage of funds 
spent on evidence based programs rising from 25, to 50, to 75 and then to 100 percent 
over an eight year period.  
 Texas:  SB 166 (requiring that county grant applications for prison diversion program 
include an evidence-based assessment process); 
 Washington:  SB 6157 (requiring that analysis be conducted to identify evidence-based 
reentry practices).  See also, SHB 1128, Laws of 2007 (partial veto)(language regarding 
juvenile programs includes: “Within amounts appropriated in this section, priority shall 
be given to proven intervention models, including evidence-based prevention and early 
intervention programs identified by the Washington state institute for public policy and 
the department.”)  
 
In addition, the Iowa DOC requires all Community Based Corrections programs (CBCs) to 
undergo an annual evaluation on adherence to evidence-based principles, develop Quality 
Improvement Action Plans, and collect and track specific performance measures. 
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Risk and Needs Assessment 
 Kansas:  Community Corrections Act, KSA §75-5291(a)(2)(E) (listing as one of its possible 
eligibility criteria that an offender be classified high risk, high need or both);  
 Virginia:  Sentencing Commission enabling statute, VCA § 17.1-803(5)-(6) (requiring the 
establishment of a risk and needs assessment to be used for all felony offenders); 
 Washington:  Offender Accountability Act, RCW 9.94A.501 (community supervision 
limited to offenders with higher risk scores or with certain current or past offenses.  Of 
the remaining offenders eligible for community supervision, those that are lower risk 
are placed on administrative probation (or “case banking”)).    
 
States focusing their resources on high risk offenders and place low risk offenders in an 
administrative category, or “case banking,” include Washington State (see WA Rev. Code § 
9.94A.501, available online at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=9.94A.501), 
Delaware, Iowa, Oregon and Vermont. 
 
Individualized Case Plans 
 Maryland:  The Maryland Proactive Community Supervision (PCS) model has 
demonstrated that how an agency provides community supervision case management 
matters.  Maryland has realized a 28 percent reduction in the rate of arrests for new 
criminal charges by offenders on supervision by implementing (1) valid assessment 
tools; (2) case plans that are responsive to the criminal risk factors of high and 
moderate-risk offenders; (3) appropriate services and controls that use social learning or 
cognitive-behavioral interventions; and (4) an environment where the offender can 
learn pro-social behaviors and successfully complete supervision.16 
 
Caseloads 
 Vermont: Department of Corrections to establish levels of supervision for each offender 
based on risk assessment, and specific caseload limits are set for different levels of 
supervision (H.859, 2008). 
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Earned Compliance Credits 
 
Problem 
More than 5 million individuals are on probation, parole or some form of community 
supervision after release from prison.  Community corrections agencies need better tools to 
supervise and better manage these individuals and motivate them to reintegrate into society.  
These agencies must allocate scarce supervision resources across large populations of 
offenders.  If these resources are distributed evenly over a population of offenders that 
presents an uneven risk profile, some offenders will be “over-supervised,” resulting in a waste 
of taxpayer dollars, while others will be “under-supervised,” resulting in decreased public 
safety.  Compliant probationers and parolees are often kept on active caseloads with the effect 
of diluting the intensity of supervision for higher-risk offenders and removing the incentive to 
behave. 
 
Solution  
For corrections agencies to efficiently allocate supervision, they must have the authority to 
focus their staff, services and sanctions on higher-risk offenders.  To do so without additional 
funding, agencies need to be able to move lower-risk probationers and parolees to less-
intensive levels of supervision—or off of supervision altogether—if they are fulfilling their 
obligations and conditions, including paying restitution.  Providing this flexibility allows agencies 
to devote time and effort to moderate- and high-risk offenders, those who present a greater 
threat to community safety and who research indicates are more likely to benefit from 
supervision and programs.  It also promises to enhance motivation and promote behavior 
change by providing offenders with incentives to meet the goals and conditions of supervision. 
 
This provision: 
 Creates an “earned compliance credit” that would reduce the time that offenders are on 
active supervision by 15 days for each month that they are in full compliance with their 
conditions of supervision, including payment of restitution to crime victims.  After an 
offender has paid all outstanding restitution, fines and fees, the court or releasing 
authority may reduce the period of supervision by the amount of credit earned. 
 
 
 
Suggested Language 
 
Section 101.  Short Title. 
 
This title may be cited as the “Earned Compliance Credit Act.” 
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Section 102.  Definitions. 
 
In this title, the following words have the meanings indicated.  
 
(1) “Agency” means: 
(A)  The Department of Corrections or the state agency responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by the courts or serving a period of parole or post-
release supervision from prison or jail; and  
(B)  Any regional, local or county governmental agencies responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by the courts or serving a period of parole or post-
release supervision from prison or jail, provided such agencies receive state funding. 
 
(2) “Case plan” means an individualized accountability and behavior change strategy for 
supervised individuals that: 
(A)  Targets and prioritizes the specific criminal risk factors of the offender; 
(B)  Matches programs to the offender’s individual characteristics, such as gender, 
culture, motivational stage, developmental stage, and learning style; 
(C)  Establishes a timetable for achieving specific behavioral goals, including a schedule 
for payment of victim restitution, child support, and other financial obligations; and 
(D)  Specifies positive and negative actions that will be taken in response to the 
supervised individual’s behaviors. 
 
(3) “Compliance credit” means [15] days for every month that a supervised individual does all of 
the following: 
(A)  Fulfills the terms of the supervised individual’s case plan; 
(B)  Has no new arrests; and 
(C)  Makes scheduled monthly payments for restitution, fines and fees. 
 
(4) “Supervised individual” means an individual placed on probation by the courts or serving a 
period of parole or post-release supervision from prison or jail.  
 
Section 103.  Earned Compliance Credits. 
 
(1)  The Agency shall: 
(A)  Award earned compliance credits to a supervised individual who satisfies the 
requirements specified in the individual’s case plan; and 
(B)  Place a supervised individual in a non-active supervision status for the number of 
days earned as compliance credits. 
 
(2)  For supervised individuals in non-active supervision, the Agency shall submit a petition to 
the court or releasing authority to request that the period of supervision be reduced by the 
number of days of compliance credits earned by the individual, when the supervised individual 
has no outstanding restitution, fines or fees. 
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(3)  The court or releasing authority may adjust the period of a supervised individual’s 
supervision on the recommendation of the Agency for earned compliance credits. 
 
(4)  The Agency shall adopt rules and regulations for the forfeiture of earned compliance credits 
for supervised individuals who violate conditions of supervision.  Such regulations shall provide 
that: 
(A)  Forfeiture is part of the Agency’s system of graduated sanctions; 
(B)  The extent of earned compliance credits forfeited is related to the level of severity 
of the violation;  
(C)  Forfeiture of earned compliance credits is limited to credits already earned, and may 
not prospectively deny future earned compliance credits; and 
(D)  A procedure is established for the restoration of forfeited earned compliance credits 
based on the supervised individual’s compliance with supervision conditions and 
progress in achieving the goals of the supervised individual’s case plan.  
 
Notes and Drafting Alternatives 
 
Items in [brackets] are terms, figures and timeframes that states may wish to adjust to their 
individual preferences or circumstances, such as the capacity of their community corrections 
agencies to implement the policy recommendations. 
 
 Section 102 (agency definition):  This definition is a placeholder intended to reflect the 
broad range of community supervision governing structures in the states.  States may want 
to reflect the name(s) of the relevant correctional agency or agencies. 
 
 Section 103 (non-active supervision):  The suggested language uses the term “active 
supervision” and “non-active supervision” to reflect the difference between when a 
supervised individual must comply with significant conditions (reporting to the 
parole/probation officer, attending programs and submitting to drug tests), and when the 
conditions are more limited, such as providing monthly pay stubs and proof of residency.  
Many states use the term “administrative supervision” or “case-banking” for non-active 
supervision.      
 
 Section 103 (petition of termination of supervision):  If the agency supervising an individual 
under post-release supervision is also the releasing authority, subsection 103(b) can be 
modified to allow the agency to implement the earned compliance credit and reduce the 
period of supervision without a petition.   
 
 Section 103 (victim notification):  States may want to incorporate specific language 
regarding the procedural rights of victims in court proceedings that may result in 
adjustments to the period of supervision.  States can provide victims an opportunity to tell 
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the agency if they wish to be notified of a change in the period of supervision.  Although 
victim notification may be covered elsewhere in the state’s statutes or constitution, 
possible language for inclusion in this statute might read:  “The court or supervision 
authority with jurisdiction to adjust the period of supervision shall establish within its policy 
and procedures a requirement that any victim be notified whenever a person's sentence of 
probation or period of supervision may be terminated pursuant to this subsection.  The 
court or supervision authority shall permit such victim to appear before them for the 
purpose of making a statement for the record concerning whether such person's sentence 
of probation or supervision period should be terminated. In lieu of such appearance, the 
victim may submit a written statement to the court or supervision authority and they shall 
make such statement a part of the record.  Prior to ordering that such person's sentence of 
probation or supervision period be continued or terminated, the court or supervision 
authority shall consider the statement made or submitted by such victim.” 
 
 Section 103 (other exemptions):  A state may wish to include a provision allowing 
prosecutors to object to the eligibility of specific offenders for earned compliance credits.   
To do so, the language could require the prosecutor to file a motion at the time of 
sentencing requesting the court exempt the defendant from the earned credit. States may 
also wish to consider exempting certain classes of offenders—those convicted of certain sex 
crimes and other serious violent felonies or those on lifetime probation, for example—in 
addition to or in lieu of this case-by-case approach. 
 
Rationale 
 
Research has shown that moderate- to high-risk offenders benefit most from supervision and 
services and that lower-risk offenders often do worse under these conditions.1  By moving 
lower-risk offenders who comply with their supervision conditions to an administrative 
supervision category (or shortening their supervision period) if they are fulfilling their 
obligations and conditions, agencies can manage their caseloads and devote time and effort to 
those who warrant it most. This flexibility enhances motivation and promotes behavioral 
change by providing incentives for meeting the goals and conditions of supervision.   
 
Providing incentives for meeting case-specific goals of supervision is a powerful tool to enhance 
individual motivation and promote positive behavior change.2  Research on human behavior 
indicates that offenders attempting to change behavior are better motivated by positive 
reinforcement than negative.3  The application of this principle to the criminal justice system is 
illustrated by the use of positive reinforcement tools such as compliance credits.4  Allowing 
lower risk offenders to earn their way off supervision by adhering to specific goals and strict 
guidelines is a particularly powerful incentive.5  In this way, supervised individuals can be more 
motivated to participate in appropriate programs, stay sober, and retain a job.   
 
Several experts suggest that after one year of complying with their supervision conditions and 
adhering to specific behavioral goals many supervised individuals could appropriately be moved 
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to an "administrative" caseload (non-active supervision), or that their supervision period be 
terminated.6  This complements research that has shown that the first weeks and months after 
release from prison is when parolees are at the highest risk of recidivism, and that recidivism 
rates stabilize in the second and third year.7  The possibility of reducing the supervision term 
through earned compliance credits not only enhances offender motivation to reform their 
behavior, but it also helps agencies better allocate scarce resources, by “frontloading” those 
resources in the first year when violations are more likely to occur and reducing supervision 
thereafter.8  
 
 Many states also have enacted legislation that enables certain prison inmates to earn “earned 
time credits” and be released earlier from prison, if they demonstrate good behavior and 
participate in treatment, education, work or other “risk reduction” programs while 
incarcerated.  A recent evaluation of the earned release time statute in Washington State found 
that the law has been effective: taxpayer costs were lower and criminal recidivism did not 
increase.  The study, by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP), found that 
recidivism actually decreased for inmates who had been imprisoned for non-violent crimes.  
Offenders who earned release time under the statute had fewer convictions, including fewer 
felony convictions, than offenders with comparable criminal histories and risk profiles who 
were released before the statute was enacted.  For those convicted of violent felonies, there 
was no statistically significant difference between inmates who earned release time under the 
new law and a comparable group released before the statute was enacted.  The WSIPP study 
estimated an average cost savings of $10,743 per offender, from both the reduction in the 
length of stay in prison and the reduction in recidivism.9 
    
State Examples 
 
 Arizona.  On June 28, 2008, Governor Janet Napolitano signed legislation (effective 
12/31/08) authorizing the court to reduce the term of an offender’s probation by up to 20 
days per month, provided the offender has met certain specific measures of probation 
compliance (“earned time credit”).  See Arizona Senate Bill 1476, at 
http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/48leg/2r/bills/sb1476s.pdf. 
 
 Nevada.  In 2007, Nevada adopted a sentencing reform act that enhances reduction-of-
sentence credits for parolees and probationers, as well as state prison inmates who 
participate in programs shown to reduce recidivism.  See Nevada Assembly Bill 510, 
effective July 1, 2007, at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Bills/AB/AB510_EN.pdf. 
 
 Delaware.  In a pilot program that led to a provision in SB 50, the Probation Reform Act, 
approximately 65 percent of probationers who entered the program were discharged early 
from their probation.  By completing certain goals established by the court, these offenders 
completed probation sentences of many years in a year to 18 months.10 
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Administrative Sanctions 
 
Problem 
In many states, probationers and parolees who violate the conditions of their community 
supervision are a major driver of prison populations and corrections spending.  In some states, 
violators account for as many as two-thirds of prison admissions.  About half the time, these 
violators are revoked to prison not for new crimes, but for breaking the rules of their 
supervision, such as not reporting to a probation officer or failing a drug test.  In 2006, 35 
percent of all state prison admissions were offenders returned to prison as a result of parole 
violations, not for new convictions. 
 
Research indicates that swift, certain and proportionate sanctions for these “technical 
violations” can improve compliance with the rules and reduce the number of violators sent to 
costly prison cells.  Yet probation and parole officers face high caseloads, a lack of community-
based sanctions and a cumbersome court process for holding violators accountable.  This 
frequently means that probation and parole officers will not go back to the court or parole 
board until an offender has committed a number of violations, at which point revocation to 
prison becomes the likely penalty.  Delayed responses to violations can give offenders the sense 
that they don’t really have to play by the rules, in effect encouraging more violations, while 
holding supervision violators in jail and prison cells takes up space that should be used for more 
dangerous inmates.  
 
Solution 
For states to deliver swift, certain and proportionate responses to violations of probation and 
parole, they need an array of institutional and community-based sanctions as well as the 
authority to assign—and reassign—offenders to those sanctions.  Many states are developing a 
continuum of sanctions, from community service programs to day reporting centers, to more 
restrictive responses such as secure residential facilities.  To maximize the certainty and 
swiftness of sanctions, several states provide parole and probation agencies the authority to 
place violators in these sanction programs, including imposing short stays in jail, without having 
to go back to court.  As part of a system of administrative sanctions for violations, states also 
should incorporate positive reinforcements that supervised individuals can receive when they 
comply with their conditions.  
 
This provision: 
 Requires community corrections agencies to adopt a set of graduated sanctions and 
rewards to respond to violations and compliance with the conditions of supervision. 
 Establishes authority for agencies to impose graduated sanctions and rewards through 
an administrative process.  
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Suggested Language 
 
Section 101.  Short Title. 
 
This Act may be cited as the “Swift and Certain Sanctions Act.”  
 
Section 102. Definitions. 
 
In this title:                                                       
 
(1)  “Agency” means: 
(A) The Department of Corrections or the state agency responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by the courts or serving a period of parole or post-
release supervision from prison or jail; and 
(B) Any regional, local or county governmental agencies responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by a court or serving a period of parole or post-release 
supervision from prison or jail, provided such agencies receive state funding. 
 
(2)  “Chief supervision officer” means *the highest ranking field probation or parole 
administrator in each judicial circuit]. 
 
(3)  "Court" means a court of record having original criminal jurisdiction.  
 
(4)  "Community supervision" means 
(A) The placement of a defendant under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with 
conditions imposed by a court for a specified period during which: 
 (i) criminal proceedings are deferred without an adjudication of guilt; 
  (ii) a sentence of imprisonment or confinement, imprisonment and fine, or 
confinement and fine, is probated and the imposition of sentence is suspended in 
whole or in part; or 
(B) The placement of an individual under a continuum of programs and sanctions after 
release from prison or jail, with conditions imposed by the releasing authority for a 
specified period. 
 
(5)  "Supervision officer" means a person appointed or employed by the Agency to supervise 
individuals placed on community supervision. 
 
(6)  “Supervised individual” means an individual placed on probation by a court or serving a 
period of parole or post-release supervision from prison or jail. 
 
(7)  “Graduated sanction” means any of a wide range of non-prison offender accountability 
measures and programs, including, but not limited to, electronic supervision tools; drug and 
alcohol testing or monitoring; day or evening reporting centers; restitution centers; forfeiture 
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of earned compliance credits; rehabilitative interventions such as substance abuse or mental 
health treatment; reporting requirements to supervision officers; community service or work 
crews; secure or unsecure residential treatment facilities or halfway houses; and short-term or 
intermittent incarceration. 
 
(8)  “Positive reinforcement” means any of a wide range of rewards and incentives,  
including but not limited to awarding certificates of achievement, reducing reporting 
requirements, deferring a monthly supervision fee payment, awarding earned compliance 
credits, removing supervision conditions such as home detention or curfew, or asking the 
offender to be a mentor to others. 
  
Section 103.  Policy on Community Supervision. 
 
It is the policy of this state that supervised individuals shall be subject to: 
 
(1)  Violation revocation proceedings and possible incarceration for failure to comply with the 
conditions of supervision when such failure constitutes a significant risk to prior victims of the 
supervised individual or the community at large, and cannot be appropriately managed in the 
community; or 
 
(2)  Sanctions other than revocation and incarceration as appropriate to the severity of the 
violation behavior, the risk of future criminal behavior by the offender, and the need for, and 
availability of, interventions which may assist the offender to remain compliant and crime-free 
in the community. 
 
Section 104.  System of Graduated Sanctions. 
 
(1) The Agency shall, by [January 1, 2010], adopt a single system of graduated sanctions for 
violations of conditions of community supervision.  The system shall set forth a menu of 
presumptive sanctions for the most common types of supervision violations, including but not 
limited to: failure to report; failure to pay fines, fees, and victim restitution; failure to 
participate in a required program or service; failure to complete community service; violation of 
a protective or no contact order; and failure to refrain from the use of alcohol or controlled 
substances.  The system of sanctions shall take into account factors such as the severity of the 
current violation, the supervised individual’s previous criminal record, the number and severity 
of any previous supervision violations, the supervised individual’s assessed risk level, and the 
extent to which graduated sanctions were imposed for previous violations.  The system also 
shall define positive reinforcements that supervised individuals will receive for compliance with 
conditions of supervision. 
 
(2)  The Agency shall establish by rules and regulations an administrative process to review and 
approve or reject, prior to imposition, graduated sanctions that deviate from those prescribed. 
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(3)  The Agency shall establish by rules and regulations an administrative process to review 
graduated sanctions contested by supervised individuals under Section 106 of this Act.  The 
review shall be conducted by an impartial Agency employee or representative who has been 
selected, appointed and trained to hear cases regarding graduated sanctions for violations of 
supervision conditions. 
 
Section 105.  Conditions of Community Supervision. 
 
For individuals placed on probation, the judge of the court having jurisdiction of the case shall 
determine the conditions of community supervision and may impose as a condition of 
community supervision that the Agency supervising the individual may, in accordance with 
Section 106 of this Act, impose graduated sanctions adopted by the Agency for violations of the 
conditions of community supervision. 
 
Section 106.  Authority to Impose Graduated Sanctions. 
 
(1) Notwithstanding any rule or law to the contrary, the Agency may: 
(A)  Modify the conditions of community supervision for the limited purpose of imposing 
graduated sanctions; and 
(B)  Place a supervised individual who violates the conditions of community supervision 
in a state or local correctional or detention facility or residential center for a period of 
not more than [five] days consecutively, and not more than [30] days in any one 
calendar year. 
 
(2)  A supervision officer intending to modify the conditions of community supervision by 
imposing a graduated sanction shall issue to the supervised individual a notice of the intended 
sanction.  The notice shall inform the supervised individual of the technical violation or 
violations alleged, the date or dates of the violation or violations, and the graduated sanction to 
be imposed. 
 
(3)  The imposition of a graduated sanction or sanctions by a community supervision officer 
must comport with the system of graduated sanctions adopted by the Agency under Section 
104 of this title.  Upon receipt of the notice, the supervised individual shall immediately accept 
or object to the sanction or sanctions proposed by the officer.  The failure of the supervised 
individual to comply with a sanction shall constitute a violation of probation, parole or post 
release supervision.  If the supervised individual objects to the imposition of the sanction or 
sanctions, the individual is entitled to an administrative review to be conducted by the Agency 
within five days of the issuance of the notice.  If the Agency affirms the recommendation 
contained in the notice, then the sanction or sanctions shall become effective immediately.  
 
(4)  If the graduated sanction involves confinement in a correctional or detention facility, 
confinement must be approved by the chief supervision officer, but the supervised individual 
may be taken into custody for up to [four] hours while such approval is obtained.  If the 
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supervised individual is employed, the supervision officer shall, to the extent feasible, impose 
this sanction on weekend days or other days and times when the supervised individual is not 
working.   
 
(5)  A sanction that confines a supervised individual in a correctional or detention facility for a 
period of more than [five] consecutive days, or extends the term of community supervision, 
may not be imposed as a graduated sanction, except pursuant to an order of the court or the 
releasing authority.   
 
(6)  A notice of a graduated sanction may not be issued for any violation of probation, parole or 
post-release supervision which could warrant an additional, separate felony charge.  
Notwithstanding this, a notice of a graduated sanction may be issued for a positive drug test. 
 
(7)  Upon successful completion of a graduated sanction or sanctions, a court may not revoke 
the term of community supervision or impose additional sanctions for the same violation. 
 
(8)  If a supervision officer modifies the conditions of community supervision by imposing a 
graduated sanction, the officer shall: 
(A) Deliver a copy of the modified conditions to the supervised individual; 
(B) File a copy of the modified conditions with the sentencing court or releasing 
authority; and 
(C) Note the date of delivery of the copy in the supervised individual’s file. 
 
Section 107.  Monitoring Graduated Sanctions. 
 
The chief supervision officer shall review confinement sanctions recommended by supervision 
officers on a quarterly basis to assess any disparities that may exist among officers, evaluate the 
effectiveness of the sanction as measured by the supervised individuals’ subsequent conduct, 
and monitor the impact on the Agency’s number and type of revocations for violations of the 
conditions of supervision. 
 
Notes and Drafting Alternatives 
 
Items in [brackets] are terms, figures and timeframes that states may wish to adjust to their 
individual preferences or circumstances, such as the capacity of their community corrections 
agencies to implement the policy recommendations. 
 
 Section 102 (agency definition):  This definition is a placeholder intended to reflect the 
broad range of community supervision governing structures in the states.  States may 
want to reflect the name(s) of the relevant correctional agency or agencies. 
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 Section 102 (graduated sanctions definition):  This section lists the most common 
community-based sanctions for offenders.  Policy makers may want to customize this 
list with specific sanctions available or anticipated in their states. 
 
 Section 104 (system of graduated sanctions):  This section recommends that community 
supervision agencies in either the executive or judicial branches adopt a single set of 
guidelines for responding to violations.  The guidelines can be written to accommodate 
the fact that different areas of states will have access to different sanctions.  Ranges of 
responses to various violations should be sufficiently narrow that it is clear to offenders 
what the sanctions will be.  This certainty and transparency lets offenders know that 
they are in control of what happens to them, that the penalties are not the random and 
arbitrary whims of a supervision officer or judge. 
 
 Section 104 (administrative process):  This provision leaves to the Agency decisions 
regarding what level of administrative process is necessary for imposing sanctions for 
violations.  Some states allow parole and probation officers to impose low level 
sanctions directly, while requiring a supervisor’s approval for more serious sanctions.  
The administrative process that would apply if a supervised individual contests the 
sanction may also differ depending on the severity of the sanction.  
 
 Section 105 (selection of offender for graduated sanctions):  This provision allows the 
court to select certain offenders to be subject to the graduated sanctions system, in 
which sanctions would be imposed administratively by the community corrections 
agency rather than the court itself.  Courts may wish to place a check-box on their 
sentencing order forms to indicate that particular offenders have been sentenced in this 
fashion.  Alternatively, states may wish to apply graduated sanctions to all supervised 
individuals or to all supervised individuals except those exempted by the court.  In those 
cases, this section may be eliminated or altered to indicate the state’s preference. 
 
 Section 106 (administrative authority to incarcerate):  Granting corrections agencies the 
authority to incarcerate violators without a judicial proceeding raises issues of due 
process.  While sanctions that restrict an offender’s liberty may require a due process 
hearing several states have legislated administrative authority to confine violators for 
limited periods of time (see State Examples below).  Based on the model used in some 
of these states, this section recommends an administrative review process involving a 
neutral Agency employee when the sanction involves confinement.  The time limits on 
individual and cumulative periods of incarceration are intended to prevent the Agency 
from abusing this authority. 
 
 Section 106 (jail reimbursement):  Other statutes govern the relationship between the 
state and local jurisdictions regarding reimbursement for state inmates in local facilities.  
This provision does not address these pre-existing arrangements.  However, graduated 
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sanctions are designed to reduce the length of time violators spend in jail awaiting 
hearings.  This should reduce local jail crowding and state reimbursement expenditures. 
 
Rationale 
 
Research shows that swift, certain and incremental (or graduated) responses to rule-breaking 
are key components of an effective strategy to change behavior.1  Graduated sanctions are 
being used in more jurisdictions across the country, and implementation is the focus of a 
significant national effort by the National Institute of Corrections. 
   
Allowing corrections agencies to hold offenders accountable for breaking the rules of 
supervision, rather than having to take them back to court, can substantially boost the 
immediacy and certainty of responses.  Supervising officers often are in the best position to 
impose meaningful and proportionate consequences to offender noncompliance, while the 
court violation process is often too cumbersome to accommodate the need for swift and 
certain consequences.  Whether imposed by courts or by supervision agencies, swift and 
certain sanctions clearly outperform business-as-usual. 2  In one case – Hawaii’s Opportunity 
Probation with Enforcement – swift and certain but graduated judicial sanctioning has proven 
in a randomized controlled trial to reduce positive drug screens by 91 percent and cut both 
revocations and new arrests by two-thirds.3 
 
Several states allow supervising officers to respond to noncompliance within a certain range of 
sanctions, including limited jail terms, without initiating a revocation process (see below).  This 
administrative structure enhances the likelihood and timeliness, and thus the effectiveness, of 
the sanction.  It also should increase uniformity in offender sanctions. 
 
There are important other benefits to the criminal justice system, including reduced use of local 
jail space by state probation and parole violators, and greater time for probation officers to 
focus on high-risk offenders.  Evaluation of the administrative sanctions program in Georgia4 
found: 
 Reductions of 70 percent or more in the average number of days that violators spent in 
local jails awaiting disposition of their violation cases.  One county reported the average 
fell from 34 days to 6 days. 
 Significant reductions in the amount of time probation officers spent waiting in 
courthouses for violation cases to be heard.  Timesheets kept by the officers indicated 
that 77 percent of their time in courthouses was spent waiting, compared to just 23 
percent actually engaged in hearings.  The administrative process saves this time, 
allowing officers to spend it supervising their caseloads. 
 
These provisions do not limit sanctions or supervision to a detention or correctional facility or 
to the use of electronic monitoring, but simply provides the legislative authority for such 
measures.  Other graduated sanctions and supervision measures can and should be used 
depending on the supervision circumstances. 
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Research also indicates that positive reinforcement, incentives and rewards are powerful tools 
in the supervision process. 5  By employing them for progress, along with sanctions for 
violations, parole and probation officers can enhance offender motivation, support positive 
behavior change and reduce recidivism.  Focusing on the gains that offenders have made can 
promote adherence to supervision conditions and encourage positive responses.  Examples of 
incentives and rewards include awarding certificates of achievement, reducing reporting 
requirements, deferring a monthly payment, removing conditions (such as home detention or 
curfew), or asking the offender to be a “mentor” to others.  Just as with sanctions, incentives 
and rewards should be provided with certainty and in a timely fashion to have the greatest 
impact on behavior change. 
  
State Examples 
 
States that have adopted administrative sanction as an alternative to revocation include: 
 Delaware:  11§4334 (Probation Reform Act, SB 50) authorizes the Department of 
Corrections to move offenders between levels of supervision, including a 
financial/restitution-only status, and to impose administrative sanctions for minor or 
technical probation violations, including up to 5 days in jail, not to exceed 10 days 
annually. 
 Florida:  §948 allows the Parole Commission to return the parolee to prison or place the 
parolee in a community control program. This program can include intensive 
supervision and surveillance, confinement to a residence outside of employment and 
public service hours, mandatory public service, electronic monitoring, and standard 
conditions of probation. 
 Georgia:  §42-8-34.1 (HB 1161) authorizes a sentencing judge to set a cap below which 
chief probation officers or Department of Corrections hearing officers may impose 
administrative sanctions, including placement in secure state residential facilities. 
 Illinois: 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4 authorizes intermediate sanctions, including a term of home 
confinement.  
 Maine:  §17-A MRSA §1208 authorizes the probation officer to impose administrative 
sanctions up to 90 days in a residential prerelease center. 
 Montana:  §46-23-1015 authorizes a hearing officer to impose up to a 30 day sanction in 
local jail for probation violations. 
 Oregon:  §137.595 and §144.106 authorize supervising agency personnel to 
administratively sanction according to a statutory sanctions guideline, including 
imposition of limited jail sanctions. 
 Oklahoma:  §57-502 establishes an Intermediate Sanctions Matrix that addresses 
technical violations. A hearing judge can determine whether a technical violation 
occurred and, if so, consult the matrix for the appropriate intermediate sanction. 
 Wisconsin:  §302.113 establishes a short term sanction program for offenders under 
Extended Supervision through the Wisconsin Truth-in-Sentencing statute.  This program 
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allows the Department of Corrections to impose as a sanction for a condition violation 
confinement in a regional detention facility or local jail for up to 90 days, as opposed to 
revocation.  In addition, the Department of Corrections has adopted regulations for 
“functional responses” to conditions violations that establish an administrative system 
for graduated sanctions.  
 Wyoming:  §7-13-1107 authorized the DOC to develop administrative sanctions as an 
alternative to probation or parole violations, not to exceed 30 days in jail or 60 days in 
community corrections center.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 The relative effectiveness of swiftness, certainty and severity of sanctions is explored in Nagin, Daniel and Greg 
Pogarsky, “Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: 
Theory and Evidence,” Criminology, 39 (4) (2001).  See also Taxman, Faye, David Soule and Adam Gelb, “Graduated 
Sanctions: Stepping Into Accountable Systems and Offenders,” Prison Journal, 79 (2), pp. 182-204 (1999); Kleiman, 
Mark, and Angela Hawken, “Fixing the Parole System,” Issues in Science and Technology (June, 2007) (available 
online at http://www.issues.org/24.4/kleiman.html#). 
 
2
 See Harrell, Adele, Ojmarrh Mitchell, Jeffrey Merrill and Douglas Marlowe, “Evaluation of Breaking the Cycle”  
(Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, April 2004); Reedy, Darin C., Faye S. Taxman, Theodore Klem and Rebecca 
Silverman, Does BTC Deter Drug Use? Lessons Learned from Three Years of Implementation (University of Maryland 
Center for Applied Policy Studies, Bureau of Governmental Research, July 2002); Harrell, Adele, Shannon Cavanagh 
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Performance Incentive Funding 
 
Problem 
Strong community corrections agencies can cut recidivism, but adequate funding for them is a 
perennial challenge in the criminal justice system.  The nation’s economic downturn is certain 
to steer funding priorities in other directions.  People on probation and parole who violate their 
conditions of supervision are a major driver of prison populations and costs.  Yet if community 
corrections agencies keep minor violators on community supervision, rather than revoke them 
to prison, the agencies get more cases but not more money to manage them.  Higher caseloads 
result in lower levels of supervision and services, which undermines the confidence of the 
courts in community options.  The net result often is still greater use of incarceration for low-
risk offenders. 
 
Solution 
States and localities can realign their fiscal relationships in ways that reward performance.  If 
corrections agencies are successful in cutting the rate of offenders sent back to prison for new 
crimes or rule violations, the state reaps savings by avoiding prison costs.  By sharing some of 
those savings with the successful agencies, states can help build stronger community 
corrections systems without appropriating new funds.  The incentive funding can be used to 
implement evidence based practices, provide effective substance abuse treatment and other 
risk reduction programs, and victim services.  The same type of incentive can be applied to state 
probation and post-release supervision agencies as well.  If state agencies save costs by 
reducing prison admissions while protecting public safety, some of those savings can be 
channeled back to those agencies so they can continue to cut crime and recidivism. 
 
This provision: 
 Appropriates to community corrections agencies up to 45 percent of the imprisonment 
costs averted when they reduce the rate of new felony convictions and the rate of 
revocations for technical violations. 
 Appropriates 30 percent of the savings for reductions in the new conviction and 
revocation rates.  Appropriates an additional five percent of the savings if the agency 
shows improvement in each of three other key outcome measures:  employment, drug 
test failures, and victim restitution collection. 
 Eliminates incentive funding if there is an increase in the agency’s new felony conviction 
rate for probationers and parolees. 
 Permits incentive funding to be used to implement evidence-based practices, expand 
effective offender programming, and provide grants to victim service organizations.  
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Suggested Language 
 
Section 101.  Short Title. 
 
This title may be cited as the “Community Corrections Performance Incentive Act.” 
 
Section 102.  Definitions. 
 
(1)  “Evidence-based practices” means supervision policies, procedures, programs and practices 
that scientific research demonstrates reduce recidivism among people on probation, parole, or 
post-release supervision. 
(2)  “Supervised individual” means an individual placed on probation by a court or serving a 
period of parole or post-release supervision from prison or jail. 
(3)  “Conditions of supervision” means conditions of probation, parole or other form of post-
prison supervision. 
 
Section 103.  Calculation of State Prison Savings. 
 
(1) The [state oversight agency] shall annually calculate: 
(A)  The percentage of supervised individuals who are revoked for violations of their 
conditions of supervision and ordered to serve a term of imprisonment in the state 
[Department of Corrections].  This calculation shall be based on the fiscal year prior to 
the fiscal year in which the report is required pursuant to Section 106 of this title.  The 
baseline revocation rate shall be the revocation rate in fiscal year 2008. 
(B)  The percentage of supervised individuals who are convicted of a new felony offense 
and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the state [Department of Corrections].  This 
calculation shall be based on the fiscal year prior to the fiscal year in which the report is 
required pursuant to Section 106 of this title.  The baseline new offense conviction rate 
shall be the conviction rate in fiscal year 2008. 
(C)  Any state expenditures that have been avoided by reductions in the revocation rate 
as calculated in paragraph (A) of this section. 
(D)  Any state expenditures that have been avoided by reductions in the new felony 
offense conviction rate as calculated in paragraph (B) of this section. 
 
(2)  The calculations in paragraph (1) of this section shall be made separately for supervised 
individuals under the supervision of probation agencies and under the supervision of parole or 
other post-prison supervision agencies, and shall be made separately by individual state and 
local agency.  
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Section 104.  Performance Incentive Funding. 
 
(1) Beginning in fiscal year 2010, the legislature shall annually appropriate up to [45] percent of 
any state expenditures that are avoided as calculated in Section 103 of this title.  Such averted 
expenditures shall be appropriated to the [state or local agency or agencies] responsible for 
those savings. 
 
(2)  The appropriations in paragraph (1) of this section are subject to the following provisions: 
(A)  None of the calculated savings shall be appropriated annually to the [state or local 
agency or agencies] if there is an increase in the percentage of individuals supervised by 
[that agency or agencies] who are convicted of a new felony offense as calculated in 
Section 103 paragraph (1)(B) of this title. 
(B)  Of the state expenditures that have been avoided by a reduction in the revocation 
rate, as calculated in Section 103 paragraph (1)(C) of this title: 
(i) [Thirty] percent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the [state or local 
agency or agencies]; 
(ii)  An additional [five] percent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the 
[state or local agency or agencies] if there is an increase in the percentage of 
people who are supervised by [that agency] and who are employed in a full-time 
job or employed part time for at least 25 hours per week, provided that the 
[agency] has submitted data to the [state oversight agency]  showing such 
increases, and the [state oversight agency] includes this information in the 
report required pursuant to Section 106 of this title; 
(iii)  An additional [five] percent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the 
[state or local agency or agencies] if there is an increase in the percentage of 
people who are supervised by [that agency or agencies] who are current in their 
payments of victim restitution, provided that the [agency] has submitted data to 
the [state oversight agency] showing such increases and the [state oversight 
agency] includes this information in the report required pursuant to Section 106 
of this title; 
(iv)  An additional [five] percent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the 
[state or local agency or agencies] if there is a decrease in the percentage of 
people who are supervised by that [agency or agencies] and who test positive for 
controlled substances, provided that the [agency] has submitted data to the 
[state oversight agency] showing such decreases and the [state oversight agency] 
includes this information in the report required pursuant to Section 106 of this 
title.  
(C)  Of the state expenditures that have been avoided by a reduction in the new felony 
offense conviction rate as calculated in Section 103 paragraph (1)(D) of this section: 
(i) Thirty percent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the state or local 
agency or agencies; 
(ii)  An additional five percent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the 
[state or local agency or agencies] if there is an increase in the percentage of 
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people who are supervised by [that agency or agencies] and who are employed 
in a full-time job or employed part time for at least 25 hours per week, provided 
that the agency has submitted data to the [state oversight agency]  showing such 
increases, and the [state oversight agency] includes this information in the 
report required pursuant to Section 106 of this title; 
(iii)  An additional five per cent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the 
[state or local agency or agencies] if there is an increase in the percentage of 
people who are supervised by that [agency or agencies] who are current in their 
payments of victim restitution, provided that the [agency] has submitted data to 
the [state oversight agency] showing such increases and the [state oversight 
agency] includes this information in the report required pursuant to Section 106 
of this title; 
(iv)  An additional five percent of the total savings shall be appropriated to the 
[state or local agency or agencies] if there is a decrease in the percentage of 
people who are supervised by [that agency or agencies] and who test positive for 
controlled substances.  
 
(3)  The monies appropriated pursuant to this title shall be used to supplement, not supplant, 
any other state or county appropriations for probation, parole or other post-prison supervision 
services. 
 
Section 105.  Use of Funds. 
 
(1) Monies received through appropriations pursuant to this title shall be used for the following 
purposes: 
(A)  Implementation of evidence-based practices; 
(B)  Increasing the availability of risk reduction programs and interventions, including 
substance abuse treatment programs, for supervised individuals; 
(C)  Grants to nonprofit victim services organizations to partner with the community 
corrections agencies and courts to assist victims and increase the amount of restitution 
collected from probationers. 
 
Section 106.  Reports. 
 
(1)  On or before [October 1] of each year, beginning in 2010, the judicial branch, [units of local 
government] and the state [Department of Corrections] shall jointly report to the [state 
oversight agency] the data necessary for the [state oversight agency] to perform the 
calculations required by Section 103 of this title. The report shall provide separate figures for 
probation and parole or other form of post-prison supervision and include for the prior fiscal 
year: 
(A)  The number of supervised individuals, by agency; 
  
Performance Incentive Funding (12/15/08)                Page 5 of 8 
Policy Framework to Strengthen Community Corrections 
Pew Center on the States, Public Safety Performance Project 
 
(B)  The number and percentage of supervised individuals, by agency, who were revoked 
for violations of their conditions of supervision and ordered to serve a term of 
imprisonment in the state [Department of Corrections]; and 
(C)  The number and percentage of supervised individuals, by agency, who were 
convicted of a new felony offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment in the state 
[Department of Corrections].  
 
(2)  On or before [December 1] of each year, beginning in 2010, the [state oversight agency] 
shall report each year on the implementation of this title to the president of the senate, the 
speaker of the house of representatives, the chief justice, and the governor.  The report shall 
include the calculations made pursuant to this Section 103 of this title and the resulting 
performance incentive funding, if any, to be appropriated. 
 
(3)  The [state oversight agency] shall make its full report and an executive summary available 
to the general public on its website. 
 
Notes and Drafting Alternatives 
 
Items in [brackets] are terms, figures and timeframes that states may wish to adjust to their 
individual preferences or circumstances, such as the capacity of their community corrections 
agencies to implement the policy recommendations. 
 
 Section 103 (state oversight agency):  These provisions require the state to calculate each 
year the percentage of probationers, parolees and individuals on post release supervision 
who are revoked to state prison in the previous year, and the amount of state costs avoided 
because those individuals are not in prison.  Each state should determine which entity is 
best positioned to make those calculations.  Arizona designates the Joint Legislative Budget 
Committee to make the calculations, but other states may wish to designate the governor’s 
budget office or another entity. 
 
 Section 103 (revocations vs. new felony convictions):  Probationers and parolees often are 
revoked for “new criminal activity” even though they have not been convicted of a new 
criminal offense.  This is possible because supervision conditions typically prohibit being 
arrested for a criminal offense, and because it is economical for courts to handle these 
incidents in shorter revocation hearings than in the full-blown proceedings required for new 
criminal cases.  Under this provision, revocations for new arrests would be counted as 
revocations under Section 103 (1)(A) and Section 106 (1)(B). 
 
 Section 103 (cost savings calculations):  States may wish to add a provision that specifies 
how savings would be calculated in their states, or charge the state oversight agency with 
developing rules or regulations that detail the calculation procedures.  Calculations should 
at least account for variable costs averted, such as food and medical expenses, and also 
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consider some of the fixed and capital expenditures that are avoided when larger numbers 
of potential inmates are avoided. 
 
 Section 104(state or local agency or agencies):  Probation can be administered at the state 
or local level, and in the executive or judicial branches of government.  These provisions are 
drafted generally, so that they apply in each of those conditions.   States may need to tailor 
the designations to fit their particular probation structures, especially when probation is a 
function of local government. 
 
 Section 104 (funding incentives for state agencies):  This title recommends that states 
incentivize state agencies, as well as local jurisdictions, to improve their performance.  In 
order to ensure that incentive funding is received by state agencies and does not supplant 
other funds, states may want to establish Performance Trust Funds or other special 
accounts. 
 
 Section 104 (additional performance incentives):  The provisions reward performance in 
other critical areas of community corrections—employment, reduced drug use and victim 
restitution.  But since there are no direct or easily tracked savings to state government 
when these outcomes are achieved, the incentive payments are dependent on the costs 
averted by reductions in prison admissions for revocations and new felony offenses.  As 
drafted, supervision agencies would receive greater portions of the savings they generate 
from reducing prison admissions for revocations and new felony offenses if they also have 
increased employment rates, reduced drug test positive rates, and increased victim 
restitution collection rates.  The incentive funding, five percent for each of the three 
outcomes, is made available if these rates are moving in the desired directions.  A specific 
minimum amount of change in the rates is not recommended. 
 
 Section 104 (funding cut-off):  Since crime prevention is the ultimate goal of community 
corrections, this provision prohibits incentive funding to agencies that see an increase in the 
rate of new felony convictions of individuals under their supervision. 
 
 Section 106 (reports):  Report dates were selected in order to provide agencies sufficient 
time to report on performance in the prior fiscal year, and the state oversight agency 
sufficient time to calculate savings, so that funding can be incorporated in the following 
year’s budgets.  This timetable may need to be adjusted to fit agency’s reporting capacities 
and state’s individual budget calendars. 
 
Rationale 
 
A number of states and localities are realigning their fiscal relationships in ways that encourage 
local authorities to develop cost-effective, community-based sanctions for carefully selected 
offenders who otherwise would be sent to prison.1  Not only does this help states and counties 
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save money, but also there is a growing body of research showing that a balanced approach to 
sanctions can reduce crime and victimization as well.2 
 
State and local governments have been working on better ways to finance community 
corrections programs since at least the 1960s, when California passed the Probation Subsidy 
Act.3  Since then, some 36 states have created some form of state-local partnership, often 
called a Community Corrections Act, which defines the corrections relationship between the 
two levels of government and establishes a state funding stream to counties for community 
corrections  
 
Beyond the traditional arrangement offered by CCAs, some states are redesigning their fiscal 
relationships with their local counterparts in the juvenile justice arena.  Both Ohio and 
California are providing additional funding incentives to local counties if they retain juveniles in 
local programs rather than sending them to the state juvenile system (see below). 
 
Few of the adult justice system partnerships, however, contain the performance incentive 
funding feature.  And though state-local partnerships have explored the potential of incentive 
funding to help manage correctional populations, state agencies to date have not been 
rewarded fiscally for their efforts to control crime and prison costs.  This title includes state-run 
probation and parole/post-prison supervision agencies since their labors also can have a 
dramatic impact. 
 
State Examples 
 Arizona:  SB 1476 (2008) creates a performance funding mechanism for probation 
departments to employ best practices to reduce crime and violations committed by people 
under probation supervision. Under the new legislation, the state will award counties that 
successfully reduce crime and probation revocations a percentage of the cost savings 
generated by these reductions at the state level. The county will then be required to 
reinvest this supplemental funding in victim services, substance abuse treatment, and 
strategies to improve community supervision and reduce recidivism. 
 Kansas:  SB 14 (2007) provides $4 million annually in state grants to county community 
corrections programs that submit plans to reduce revocations by 20 percent. 
 
 Ohio:  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. sec. 5139.41-.44 (Supp. 2000). The Reasoned and Equitable 
Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors (RECLAIM) system, started 
in 1993, provides subsidy grants to the state’s counties to serve up to 100,000 youth 
annually through about 700 programs. About $30 million in RECLAIM funds and $20 million 
in “base” youth services funding combine to pay for programs. RECLAIM Ohio gives each 
county a fund for local programs based on a formula, and encourages courts to keep low-
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risk delinquents in county programs by deducting amounts from the fund for each low-risk 
delinquent sent to state facilities.4 
 
 California:  SB 81 (2007) provides counties with block grant funds—an average of $130,000 
per youth—to pay for alternatives to a state commitment for juvenile offenders. To receive 
a grant, counties must submit a Juvenile Justice Development Plan outlining their intended 
use of the funds. SB 81 also authorized up to $100 million statewide in bond funds for the 
design and construction of new or renovated county facilities for youthful offenders. 
Oversight will be provided by the state’s Juvenile Justice Commission. The reform bill is 
expected to cut the population in state juvenile facilities from 2,500 to about 1,500 within 
two years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 For an overview of this topic, see Pew Center on the States’ Public Safety Performance Project, Getting in Sync: 
State-Local Fiscal Partnerships for Public Safety (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Charitable Trusts, July 2008). 
 
2
 See, for example, Sherman, L.W., “Thinking About Crime Prevention” in Sherman, L.W., D. Gottfredson, D. 
MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter and S. Bushway, Preventing Crime; What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1997). 
 
3
  The Probation Subsidy Act, enacted by California in 1965, provided counties up to $4,000 for each prison-eligible 
adult or juvenile offender who was supervised, sanctioned and serviced in the community.  In combination with 
other reforms, the Act led to several successes achieved under Governor Ronald Reagan.  Between 1969 and 1972, 
the state placed nearly all non-violent property offenders under local supervision, cut its inmate population by 30 
percent, closed eight prison facilities, and drove recidivism (within two years of release) down from 40 percent to 
25 percent. 
 
4
 Since initiating RECLAIM, Ohio has seen a drop of approximately 45 percent in admissions to the state’s 
residential facilities. A trio of University of Cincinnati evaluations has shown that RECLAIM saves Ohio taxpayers 
between $11 and $45 for every dollar spent.  Please see Lowenkamp, Christopher T. and Edward J. Latessa, 
Evaluation of Ohio’s RECLAIM Funded Programs, Community Correctional Facilities, and DYS Facilities: Cost-benefit 
Analysis—Final Report (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati, Division of Criminal Justice, 2005). Available online at 
www.dys.ohio.gov/dysweb/Reclaim/DYSCostBenefit121205.pdf. 
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5 
 
 
Performance Measurement 
 
Problem 
Many community corrections agencies lack a systematic approach to performance 
measurement that would enable them and their key stakeholders and constituents to 
effectively judge how well the agencies are accomplishing their goals.  Where performance 
measures exist, most are primarily case flow measures (new cases received, cases discharged, 
cases remaining), activity counts (number of office or field contacts completed, number of drug 
tests administered), point-in-time snapshots (average caseload size, types of cases supervised), 
and other process measures.  Such measures provide information about the agency workload, 
but fail to address the results achieved by the agency.  The absence of outcome measures 
handicaps policy makers and others who wish to assess the overall performance of the agency, 
and also limits the ability of corrections executives to effectively manage their staff and 
resources.  It is difficult for agency leaders to make optimal use of staff if they don’t know 
which staff and programs are and are not meeting their goals. 
 
Solution 
Community corrections agencies should implement a systematic performance measurement 
model, which includes measures of outcomes in key performance areas.  Such a model would 
provide regular, objective and quantitative feedback on how well agencies are achieving their 
goals.  Such information would help agency managers and staff as well as the public judge how 
well the agency is performing, and would provide managers with accurate and reliable 
information on which to base their management decisions. 
 
A comprehensive performance measurement system would address the many tasks that 
community corrections agencies are responsible for:  tracking performance at multiple levels 
(individual cases, staff, units, programs and the entire agency) and examining both process and 
outcome measures.  It is useful to begin with a more modest approach that identifies a small 
group of outcome measures for key performance areas.  These can be implemented more 
readily and can form the basis for a larger system. 
 
This provision: 
 Requires offender supervision agencies to set up a system to track and report regularly 
on key performance measures as defined by the American Correctional Association. 
 The measures are:  recidivism, employment, substance use, payment of victim 
restitution, compliance with “no contact” orders, and the overall performance of 
supervised individuals as measured by the type of discharge from supervision. 
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Suggested Language 
 
Section 101. Short Title. 
 
This Act may be cited as the “Community Corrections Performance Measurement Act.” 
 
Section 102. Definitions. 
 
In this title: 
 
(1)  “Agency” means: 
(A)  The Department of Corrections or the state agency responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by the courts or serving a period of parole or post-
incarceration supervision after jail or prison; and 
(B)  Any regional county or local government agencies responsible for supervising 
individuals placed on probation by the courts or serving a period of parole or post-
incarceration supervision after jail or prison, provided such agencies receive state 
funding. 
 
(2)  “Community Supervision” means: 
(A)  The placement of an individual under supervision in the community by a court for a 
specified period with conditions imposed, as a result of either a conviction and sentence 
to probation, or the suspension of criminal proceedings without an adjudication of guilt; 
or 
(B)  The placement of an individual released from jail or prison under supervision in the 
community for a specified period with conditions imposed by the releasing authority. 
 
(3)  “Supervised Individual” means an individual placed on supervision or probation by a court 
or serving a period of parole or post-incarceration supervision following jail or prison. 
 
(4)  “Performance Measurement System” means a systematic method of identifying, recording, 
compiling, analyzing, reporting and applying information about an agency’s activities and 
accomplishments, for both internal management purposes and for accounting to supervising 
and oversight agencies, legislative and executive bodies, constituents and stakeholders and the 
public. 
 
(5)  “Key Performance Indicator” means a measure that captures agency performance on 
critical variables that are central to the accomplishment of the agency mission and goals. 
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(6)  “Recidivism” means: 
(A)  The arrest of a supervised individual for a new offense while under community 
supervision; 
(B)  The conviction of a supervised individual for a new offense while under community 
supervision; or 
(C)  The adjudication of a supervised individual for violation of the conditions of 
supervision while under community supervision. 
 
(7)  “Employment” means that the supervised individual is employed  
(A)  Full time (more than X hours per week) at legitimate employment; or 
(B)  Part time (less than X hours per week) at legitimate employment. 
 
(8)  “Controlled Substances” means drugs and other illicit substances whose possession and use 
is controlled or regulated by the state. 
 
(9)  “Substance Abuse Testing” means the administration of quantitative tests using urine, 
saliva or other approved methods to detect the use of controlled substances by supervised 
individuals. 
 
(10) “Victim Restitution” means court-ordered financial payments to the victim of a crime by 
the supervised individual for compensation of damage or loss. 
 
(11) “Victim Protection” means compliance with “no contact” orders by the supervised 
individual. 
 
(12) “Status of Discharge from Supervision” means the status of supervised individuals when 
they were removed from supervision.  A successful discharge is one in which the supervised 
individual is removed from supervision at the end of the term or prior to the end of the term, 
having fully or substantially completed the requirements of supervision.  An unsuccessful 
discharge is when the supervised individual is removed from supervision through revocation for 
violation of the conditions of supervision or for a new offense. 
 
Section 103.  Implementation of Performance Measures. 
 
(1)  The agency shall develop and implement a performance measurement system within [18 
months] of the effective date of this Act. 
 
(2)  The performance measurement system shall include, at a minimum, information on the 
following key performance indicators: 
 (A)  Recidivism of supervised individuals; 
 (B)  Employment of supervised individuals; 
 (C)  Substance use by supervised individuals; 
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 (D)  Victim restitution paid by supervised individuals; 
 (E)  Compliance with “no contact” orders by supervised individuals; and 
 (F)  Status of discharge from supervision. 
 
(3)  The  performance measures should be formatted and reported consistent with the 
following outcome measures prescribed in the Performance Based Standards for Adult 
Probation and Parole Field Services (4th edition) published by the American Correctional 
Association: 
(A) Recidivism – Performance Standard 1A, Outcome Measures 1 and 2, Performance 
Standards 2B, Outcome Measures 1, 2, and 3; 
(B) Employment – Performance Standard 2D, Outcome Measures 1 and 2; 
(C) Substance Use – Performance Standard 2D, Outcome Measure 3; 
(D) Victim Restitution – Performance Standard 2E, Outcome Measures 2, 3 and 4; 
(E) Victim Protection – Performance Standard 2E, Outcome Measure 1; 
(F) Status of Discharge from Supervision – Performance Standard 2A, Outcome  
Measure 1. 
 
(4)  The agency shall ensure that accurate, reliable and complete records are maintained on the 
key performance indicators. 
 
(5)  The agency shall report on agency performance on the key performance indicators at least 
annually to supervising and oversight agencies, legislative and executive bodies, constituents 
and stakeholders and the public. 
 
(6)  The agency shall utilize information on the key performance indicators for agency 
management purposes, reporting and reviewing performance on no less than a monthly basis. 
 
Notes and Drafting Alternatives 
 
Items in [brackets] are terms, figures and timeframes that states may wish to adjust to their 
individual preferences or circumstances, such as the capacity of their community corrections 
agencies to implement the policy recommendations. 
 
Section 102 (1):  This definition of agency is a placeholder designed to reflect the broad range of 
governing structures for community corrections in the states.  States may wish to add the 
names of the relevant state agencies.  Regional, county or local agencies may be included if 
they receive state funding. 
 
Section 102 (2) (A):  This definition reflects the fact that in addition to a formal conviction and 
sentence to probation, many individuals are placed under supervision without a conviction and 
sentence.  These cases are typically called deferred prosecution, diversion or similar terms.  The 
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individuals still are placed under supervision with conditions.  Individuals who fail to comply 
with the conditions of supervision may be discharged from the program and their case returned 
to normal criminal case processing. 
 
Section 102 (3):  This includes the diverted or deferred cases as noted above. 
 
Section 103 (1):  Community corrections agencies have widely varying data capacities which can 
impact how quickly they are able to implement performance measures.  This section 
recommends an 18-month period for development and implementation.  Depending on data 
systems and other issues, states may wish to allot more or less time for the system to begin 
functioning. 
 
Section 103 (2):  A comprehensive performance measurement system would include many 
more measures than these six. This listing should not limit an agency in developing its 
performance measurement system.  Other measures could include community service work, 
housing, and offenders’ social networks.   
 
Section 103 (3):  These standards, attached as an appendix, were in final draft form as of 
December 2008.  Regarding restitution, some probation and parole agencies do not collect the 
restitution payments; that function may be handled by the court clerk or some other agency.  
The supervision agencies should nonetheless be monitoring payments and taking action to 
enforce compliance with the payment schedule.  Moreover, the ACA Performance Based 
Standards referenced above also include a measure for victim protection – the number of 
offenders who have “stay away from” or “no contact with” or “no violence toward” orders in 
the past 12 months, divided by the number of offenders who violated these orders in the past 
12 months (2E(1)).  These measures may be more difficult for agencies to institute than some of 
the other measures, and states may wish to provide a longer lead time than 18 months for 
agencies to implement them. 
 
Section 103 (4):  The agency should take proactive steps to ensure that data is complete and 
accurate.  
 
Section 103 (5):  This is a minimum recommendation for reporting.  More frequent reporting is 
desirable. 
 
Section 103 (6):  Agencies should consider adopting “PerformanceStat” type management 
models to enhance the use and impact of the performance data within the agency.1  Based on 
the “Compstat” model developed by the New York City Police Department, the model has been 
adapted by a number of probation and parole agencies.2 
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Rationale 
 
Recidivism.  Research shows that well-designed and well-implemented correctional strategies 
and programs can reduce offending by probationers and parolees.3  Since promoting public 
safety and reducing crime by offenders under supervision is a core mission of community 
corrections, measuring recidivism, or new criminal activity, often is regarded as the chief 
performance indicator.  If community corrections agencies implement effective programs well, 
they should see a reduction in recidivism.  To determine if recidivism is being reduced and by 
how much, it should be measured and reported on a regular basis.  States may also wish to 
measure and report recidivism by offender risk levels.  
 
Employment.  Individuals under probation or parole supervision are routinely required to 
obtain and maintain gainful, legitimate employment.  This requirement is frequently a 
“standard condition” of supervision imposed by the sentencing court or paroling authority. 
There are many reasons that support such a requirement.  Individuals who are unemployed 
pose a higher risk of reoffending.4  Obtaining a job reduces the individual’s risk of committing 
new crime.5  Having a job provides the individual with income, enabling them to support 
themselves and their dependents, pay taxes, pay restitution and child support, and generally be 
a productive member of the community.6  Lastly, the public expects individuals under 
supervision to be working and paying their way, not living off others or the state.  Community 
corrections agencies should ensure that all able individuals under supervision are working, and 
should assist those who do not have a job in obtaining one.  In a survey of state parole agencies 
in 2004, 78 percent of the agencies reporting required employment as a condition of parole, 
but only 21 percent tracked the employment status of the parolees.7  Employment rates of 
supervised individuals should be measured and reported on a regular basis.  Some states may 
also wish to measure, and perhaps include with employment figures, individuals who are full-
time students, whether in a community college or university setting, or in a trade or business 
school. 
 
Substance Abuse.  The correlation between crime and the use of illegal substances and abuse 
of alcohol is well documented.  Estimates range between half to three- quarters of offenders 
have some connection to illegal drugs and/or alcohol.8  This connection may be the commission 
of a drug offense or an offense to obtain drugs, an active addiction or a history of abuse and/or 
addiction.  Use of illegal drugs is prohibited generally for individuals under supervision by the 
requirement that they obey all laws, and specifically by a common supervision condition to 
refrain from use of illegal substances.  Much of the work of probation and parole officers 
involves monitoring offenders for drug use and providing addiction counseling and referrals to 
treatment for those offenders who persist in using drugs.  Most community corrections 
agencies conduct regular testing for drug use to determine whether offenders are using drugs.9  
As a key indicator of criminal behavior, the results of drug testing should be compiled and 
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reported on a regular basis.  The number of offenders who complete substance abuse 
treatment programs is another measure that could be used. 
 
Victim Restitution.  Payment of financial restitution by an offender to the victim of the crime to 
compensate for damage or loss is a fundamental principle of American common law.  Every 
state has a set of legal rights for crime victims in its code of laws, often called a victims' bill of 
rights.  These generally include the rights to restitution from a convicted offender.  In addition 
to statutory rights of victims, 32 states have adopted state victims' rights constitutional 
amendments.10  Restitution is ordered by the court and incorporated into the conviction order. 
As a result, it is incumbent on community corrections agencies to monitor payment of 
restitution and take enforcement actions as needed to compel offenders to pay the restitution 
ordered.  Timely and effective enforcement of restitution orders is essential to meeting the 
constitutional obligation to the victim and to maintaining the integrity of the court’s order.  The 
degree of compliance with restitution orders and the amount of restitution collected should be 
compiled and reported on a regular basis.   
 
Victim Protection.  Court or parole orders often includes a “no contact” condition designed to 
prohibit offenders from having any contact with the victim of the offense.  Such conditions are 
critical to victim safety and peace of mind. Community corrections agencies should monitor 
compliance with such orders, and compile and report the results on a regular basis. 
 
Status of Discharge from Supervision.  The status of discharge from supervision provides 
another, broader measure of overall effectiveness of community supervision.  “Successful” 
discharges are those supervised individuals who have completed their term without being 
revoked, or who have been granted discharge prior to the expiration of the full term of 
supervision for exemplary behavior and compliance with the conditions of supervision. 
Supervised individuals who are revoked from supervision for new criminal activity of for 
substantial violations of the conditions of supervision are categorized as “unsuccessful” 
discharges. 
 
State Examples 
 
Corrections agencies in several states have established performance measurement systems.  
The following are a few examples: 
 
Arizona Department of Corrections 
http://www.azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/5YearPlan05.pdf 
http://www.azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/CAG/CAGAug08.pdf 
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Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles 
http://www.pap.state.ga.us/opencms/export/sites/default/resources/07Annual_Report
.pdf 
 
Iowa Department of Corrections 
http://www.doc.state.ia.us/Documents/2006AnnualPerformanceReport.pdf 
 
Maryland Department of Public safety and Correctional Services 
http://www.gov.state.md.us/statestat/reports/DPPvol2no15.pdf 
 
New Jersey Probation Services 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/quant/cman0809.pdf 
 
Oregon Progress Board 
http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/OPB/GOVresults.shtml#top 
 
Texas Legislative Budget Board 
http://www.lbb.state.tx.us/PubSafety_CrimJustice/2_Current_Corr_Pop_Indicators/Reci
divism_tables.pdf 
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APPENDIX  
 
Outcome measures prescribed in the Performance Based Standards for Adult Probation and 
Parole Field Services (4th edition) published by the American Correctional Association. 
 
Recidivism 
1A. Members of the community are protected from crime. 
(1) Number of offenders who were arrested for any offense in the past 12 months 
divided by the total agency caseload in the past 12 months 
(2) Number of offenders who were convicted of any offense in the past 12 months 
divided by the total agency caseload in the past 12 months 
 
2B. Offenders comply with conditions ordered by the sentencing court or releasing  
authority. 
(1) Number of offenders found in violation of a new offense during the past 12 months, 
divided by the total agency caseload during the past 12 months 
(2) Number of offenders found in violation of a technical violation only during the past 
12 months, divided by the total agency caseload during the past 12 months 
(3) Number of offenders who absconded during the past 12 months, divided by the 
number of offenders who were under supervision in the past 12 months 
 
Employment 
2D. Offenders are successful in the community during their sentences and after discharge. 
(1) Number of offenders who were employed on a specified day in the past 12 months 
(single day count), divided by the total agency active caseload on that day 
(2) Number of offenders who were employed upon discharge in the past 12 months 
divided by the number of offenders discharged in the past 12 months 
 
Substance Use 
2D. Offenders are successful in the community during their sentences and after discharge. 
(3) Number of offender substance abuse tests for which the results were negative in the 
past 12 months divided by the number of tests administered in the past 12 months 
 
Victim Restitution 
2E. Offenders comply with all conditions of the court or releasing authority. 
(2) Amount of restitution collected in the past 12 months 
 (3) Amount of restitution ordered in the past 12 months 
 (4) Number of offenders whose cases were closed with total restitution paid in the  
past 12 months divided by the number of offenders whose cases were closed
 with restitution ordered in the past 12 months 
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Victim Protection 
2E. Offenders comply with all conditions of the court or releasing authority. 
(1) Number of offenders who had “stay away from” or “no contact with” or “no  
violence toward” orders in the past 12 months, divided by the number of 
offenders who violated these orders in the past 12 months 
 
Status of Discharge from Supervision 
2E. Offenders behave lawfully while under the supervision of the agency. 
(1) Number of offenders who successfully completed supervision in the past 12 
months divided by the number of offenders removed from supervision in the 
past 12 months (discharged and revoked).  (Comment: “discharged and revoked” 
includes offenders successfully and unsuccessfully terminated from supervision) 
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